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The aim of this article is to analyze the impact of development interventions on the population of three
Nigerien villages that differ in terms of their agro-ecological, social and economic characteristics. This is
performed by simulating the behavior of individuals in an agent-based modeling framework which inte-
grates the village characteristics as well as the family internal rules that condition access to economic and
production activities. Villagers are differentiated according to the social and agro-ecological constraints
they are subjected to. Two development project interventions are simulated, assuming no land scarcity:
increasing the availability of inorganic fertilizers for farmers and an inventory credit technique based on
millet grain. Two distinct approaches were used to model the rationale of farmers’ decision making: gains
or losses in economic value or gains or losses in within-village ‘‘reputation’’. Our results show that village
populations do not respond en masse to development interventions. Reputation has little effect on the
population behavior and should be considered more as a local proxy for wealth amongst villagers, sug-
gesting the monetization of these societies. Populations involve themselves in the two simulated devel-
opment interventions only at sites where savings are possible. Some level of household food security and
investment capacity is actually required to take part in the development interventions, which are largely
conditioned by family manpower and size. As long as uncultivated land remains available in the village
territory, support for inorganic fertilizers has little impact in the absence of any intensiﬁcation process.
Inventory credit engages a maximum of 25% of the population at the site with medium agro-ecological
conditions. Therefore, both interventions should be viewed as a potential support tool for a limited part
of the population capable of going beyond the survival level, but not as a generic poverty-alleviation
panacea.
 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The low impact that development specialists have had on rural
societies in Sahelian Africa for half a century has created a huge de-
bate within and between scientiﬁc disciplines, but also in the
development arena (Hambally, 1999; Lavigne-Delville, 1999; Mor-
timore and Adams, 2001). This debate intensiﬁed after the food cri-
sis Niger suffered in 2005 (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2005;
Harragin, 2006). In view of this recurrent failure of development
interventions to meet their goals, development specialists have
been urged to improve the relevance and the efﬁciency of their
interventions (Decoudras, 1990; Watkins and von Braun, 2004;
Dollar and Levin, 2006).ll rights reserved.
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al. Targeting rural developmenAs for any action, a development action should integrate a
‘‘marketing’’ strategy: who are the target population groups, what
is the expected impact of such interventions on the environment
and society, and what are the factors that condition the impact
of the intervention within a population? In the case of develop-
ment interventions aimed at supporting agricultural production
in the Sahel, it is generally very difﬁcult to verify ex-ante whether
the targetted population groups are indeed the beneﬁciaries of the
development actions or whether the actual impact will meet
expectations given the inherent complexity of the village produc-
tion systems Biershenk et al. (2000). Indeed, land tenures are var-
ied and complex (Le Bris et al., 1991; Lavigne-Delville, 1998;
McCarthy et al., 2000). Strong interactions between on- and off-
farm production activities and consumption decisions (de Janvry
and Sadoulet, 2003), the division of assets amongst villagers and
family members as well as multipurpose strategies are some addi-
tional socio-economic variables that may affect the outcome of the
development interventions. All these elements cannot be analyzedt interventions: Empirical agent-based modeling in Nigerien villages. Agr.
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Gilbert, 2005), which justiﬁes the use of a modeling approach. As
reviewed by Lambin et al. (2001) and Bousquet and Le Page
(2004), agent-based models (ABMs) have been found particularly
useful for simulating the multi-disciplinary and multipurpose real-
ity of the rural world. The purpose of the present article is there-
fore to identify the target groups and evaluate the potential
impact of two development interventions by means of an ABM
modeling approach.
The two selected interventions are emblematic of agricultural
development strategies in Niger and are generally viewed by don-
nors and development specialists alike as non-discriminant, i.e., all
population groups involved in agriculture may potentially beneﬁt
from them. The ﬁrst intervention considered here is support for
the use of inorganic fertilizers. Niger having one of the lowest inor-
ganic fertilizer use rates in the world (0.27 kg/ha), inorganic fertil-
izers are considered by many development specialists as the
bottleneck for rainfed cropping intensiﬁcation and higher income
generation (de Rouw and Rajot, 2004; Ouédraogo, 2005). The aim
is to promote the use of inorganic fertilizers in rainfed food crop
production and vegetable gardens. This is achieved, through farm-
ers’ organizations, by increasing the availability of inorganic fertil-
izers at the village-level as well as improving farmers knowledge
on their use, with an emphasis on the microdose technology (Tahi-
rou and Sanders, 2005; Gérard et al., 2007). This latter technology
improves inorganic fertilizer efﬁciency and generates less weed
pressure than blanket fertilizer applications (Muehlig-Versen
et al., 2003). The promoted inorganic fertilizer is di-ammonium
phosphate (DAP). Members of farmer organizations can buy inor-
ganic fertilizers at market price. These organizations almost en-
tirely consist of either women or men. They use inorganic
fertilizers for gardens, cash crops or cereal ﬁelds.
The second intervention considered in the present paper is
inventory credit. It is a credit technique which uses non-perishable
agricultural produce as a guarantee. This technique is actually
implemented in Niger under various modalities, depending on
the site, the microﬁnance institution (MFI) and the farmers associ-
ation (FA) involved. Usually, part of the farmer’s millet grain har-
vest is stored right after harvest in a reliable warehouse as a
guarantee for the credit operator. In exchange, the latter provides
a credit equivalent to the value of the stock at the time of the deal,
usually around €13.75 per 100 kg millet grain bag, from which 10%
is subtracted for storage and transaction fees. The farmer reim-
burses the credit by buying back his/her stored grain later in the
year, usually during the ‘‘soudure’’ period (i.e., the 2 to 3-month
period which precedes harvest) when prices have risen as a result
of increasing food scarcity and thereby avoids buying millet on theFig. 1. Rainfed Niger and locati
Please cite this article in press as: Saqalli, M., et al. Targeting rural developmen
Syst. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.agsy.2010.12.007market. The economic beneﬁt that results from the price increase
avoidance during the storage period belongs to the farmer. The
objective is to provide better access to ﬁnancial resources (Bada-
massi, 2006) and to secure farmer income, by compensating for
millet price ﬂuctuations (Pender et al., 2006).
2. Methodology
For more details regarding the methodology, ﬁeld data and
modeling assumptions, the reader is referred to Saqalli (2008).
2.1. Description of the study sites
The program which supported our research was hosted and
managed by a consortium of farmers’ associations and develop-
ment and research operators working in Niger. The operators of
the consortium had collected extensive literature and data sets
over the past 20 years. They were involved in the implementation
of the two selected development interventions at 3 contrasted sites
of the agro-pastoral zone of Niger (Fig. 1): Zermou in the region of
Zinder, Gabi in the region of Maradi and Fakara in the region of Til-
labery. The latter was the main location where we elaborated our
social hypotheses, which were then extended to the two other sites
with the support of the available literature (Luxereau and Roussel,
1997; Waziri Mato, 2000; Mortimore et al., 2001; Jouve, 2003;
Yamba, 2005).
The three sites are: (i) situated in areas with rainfed agriculture,
(ii) close to a regional urban pole, and (iii) linked to the main farm-
ing ethnic groups of the country (Zarma around Niamey, Hausa in
Maradi, and Hausa/Hausa-speaking Kanuri in the region of Zinder).
Furthermore, they are (iv) considered as poorly resources-en-
dowed, and (v) they have been actively researched and subjected
to development actions by operators working for more than ten
years in Niger (Gérard, 2002). Each site covers an area of about
2000 km2. The main differences between the sites are summarized
in Table 1. The sites follow a gradient of rainfall and population
density from Gabi (wettest and most populated) to Zermou (driest
and least populated).
Rainfed millet and sorghum-based agriculture is the main activ-
ity at all sites, both in terms of land use and manpower require-
ments. It is managed in an extensive and anti-risk approach. The
rainfed part of the country experiences a low to moderate rainfall
between 200 and 800 mm, distributed in a single rainy season from
June to October, but its main characteristic is its high spatial and
temporal intra-annual and inter-annual variability (Akponikpe
et al., 2011). Soils have a very low fertility as well as a poor water
and cation retention capacity (Graef and Haigis, 2001). Manure ison of the three study sites.
t interventions: Empirical agent-based modeling in Nigerien villages. Agr.
Table 1
Factors differentiating the three sites as implemented in the SimSahel model.
Zermou Fakara Gabi
Location Zinder Region, Eastern Niger Tillabery Region, Western Niger Maradi Region, Central
Niger
Annual rainfall Mean: 350 mm Mean: 450 mm Mean: 550 mm
Variability: 70–525 mm Variability: 180–675 mm Variability: 275–775 mm
Average soil fertility Poor Average Good
Soil arability proportion (%) Valley Plain Stony hills Valley Plain Plateaus Valley Plain Hills
0.1 69.9 30.0 3.9 79.6 16.5 18.1 60.0 21.9
Initial Agronomic potential 2 1 0 2 1 0 2 1 0,5
Access to shallow water Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No
Migration destination & impact on other activities Gardening incompatible with
migration
No competition between gardening & migration
because of the gender differentiation
Gardening compatible with
migration
Migration constraints Transport costs: 45 kFCFA Transport costs: 30 kFCFA Transport costs: 5 kFCFA
Racketeering risks: 2% Racketeering risks: 1% Racketeering risks: 0.5%
Women activity Sheep raising Sheep raising & gardening Sheep raising
Men activity Farming, migration & gardening Farming & migration Farming, migration &
gardening
Present-time inheritance systema Local traditional Local traditional Local Muslim
a The customary so-called traditional mode is considered as favoring one of the male descendents, usually the elder, by giving him almost all the concerned assets, leaving
symbolic elements and some small livestock to the others. The local adaptation of the Muslim inheritance system shares the assets between all the male heirs, splitting half of
the heritage to the brothers of the dead and half to his sons.
M. Saqalli et al. / Agricultural Systems xxx (2011) xxx–xxx 3the main local fertilization method, but it is not available in quan-
tities large enough to meet demand (La Rovere, 2001), while at the
same time inorganic fertilizers are still expensive.
Male farmers migrate during the dry season, from October to
May, usually to work as small-scale traders (Rain, 1999; Timera,
2001). The money they bring back home is an important source
of income for the remaining family members, around €290 per
family per year (Reardon, 1994; Mounkaïla, 2003; Saqalli et al.,
2010). These funds are mainly used to fulﬁll food requirements
that agriculture no longer satisﬁes, for male ostentation purposes
such as cigarettes or sunglasses, and to cover expenses for social
(i.e., marriage) and religious (i.e., Tabaski, the main Muslim feast)
ceremonies. For instance, each marriage can cost €1150, shared
among the community. In addition, a dowry is given to the bride’s
family, a sum equivalent to two bulls, i.e. almost €300. In addition,
migrants buy small ruminants upon returning frommigration. This
allows them to withdraw some cash from the constant requests of
the family at large but also, after selling the animal, to pay for the
travel expenses of the next migration, usually just after crop har-
vest (Saqalli et al., 2010).
Dry season vegetable gardening can be practiced only in some
villages where wells provide access to shallow groundwater in thal-
weg ﬁelds. Social access to gardening varies according to the site. At
the Fakara site, it is currently restricted to married and respectable
women with family manpower, who borrow ﬁelds after millet har-
vest. This activity provides on average €52.50 per gardener per year
(Saqalli et al., 2010). Gabi has seen a shift in the gardening activity
from a female-driven traditional activity to a pure male activity.
This is due on the one hand to a better access to markets and the
availability of a large acreage of land suitable for irrigation, which
results in a greater proﬁtability of gardening at Gabi compared to
the other sites and hence attracts a growing number of male gar-
deners. On the other hand, women are more and more kept away
from ﬁelds as a result of a growing social pressure. The site of Zer-
mou has experienced the same social shift but is endowed with
only a very small acreage of land suitable for vegetable cropping.
2.2. Overall modeling approach and assumptions
The overall research methodology was based on an iterative
process between ﬁeld investigations, discussions with local ex-
perts, and modeling. Model rule development was supported by
a two-year ﬁeld investigation and participatory observation period
in several groups of villages and local organizations, similar to thePlease cite this article in press as: Saqalli, M., et al. Targeting rural developmen
Syst. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.agsy.2010.12.007investigation method described by Bogdan and Taylor (1975). Rep-
etitions along interviews and cross-checking between sources
were the criteria used for validation of the model rules. The rules
were then compared to behavior descriptions and rules described
in the available literature. As for the model rules, the different
modeling scenarios were also deﬁned on the basis of ﬁeld observa-
tions, discussions with experts and a literature review.
Our strategy was to combine rather than juxtapose different
disciplines in a single comprehensive model, in order to compare
both development interventions in terms of impact on the popula-
tion under different local environments. Consequently, we did
have to formulate numerous hypotheses:
1. The success of a development intervention is not deﬁned by its
very characteristics but results from the villagers perception of
this intervention, whatever its intrinsic quality. The factors and
constraints selected for implementing a development interven-
tion in the model are thus deﬁned on the basis of the villagers’
perception.
2. The model is individual-based: the behavior of each villager
agent depends on his own social characteristics and constraints,
in order to combine at this very level all the complexity and the
speciﬁcity of each individual in a village (Deffuant et al., 2002).
Modeling individual behavior rather than household behavior
was selected because it has been shown previously, and con-
ﬁrmed by our own investigations, that the ‘‘household’’ unit is
not a relevant concept for sahelian rural situations (Gastellu
and Dubois, 1997; Saqalli et al., 2010).
3. The model is empirical, and villager behavior and processes are
reactive rather than cognitive. Villagers simply do what they
have to do and react as a function of time and events without
cognitive functions that would require absolute rather than rel-
ative parameterization of social values. The only cognitive func-
tion of the villagers pertains to their involvement in a
development intervention (see Section 2.4.3). The different
activities are implemented in the simplest possible way in order
to maintain the global consistency of the system.
4. Considering all the components of a system and simplifying
them appeared more relevant than focusing on the one compo-
nent which seems a priori to be the most important (Alacs,
2004; Amblard and Phan, 2006). This model is therefore not
based on the binary relationship between a villager and the
development intervention but the development intervention
is just one component guiding the activities of a villager agent.t interventions: Empirical agent-based modeling in Nigerien villages. Agr.
4 M. Saqalli et al. / Agricultural Systems xxx (2011) xxx–xxx2.3. Field investigation methodology
2.3.1. Assessing the organization of a rural village
The agro-ecological part of the model was developed on the ba-
sis of data available in the literature (La Rovere, 2001; Gérard,
2005). Millet price and rainfall data as well as the functions relat-
ing millet growth to fertility and rainfall came from ICRISAT and
ILRI databases.
The social part of the model was developed through the follow-
ing: (1) transects and local perception-based regional maps (Saqalli
et al., 2009). These maps, and the information collected for drawing
them, allowed to identify the villagers’ hierarchy of variables that
characterize the biophysical environment. In addition, the maps
guided the selection of villages in which we carried out individual
interviews. (2) Participatory Research Assessments (PRAs) were
carried out in 8 villages using the methodology and principles of
Chambers (1994). (3) 175 semi-direct individual interviews across
28 villages focused on the main activity carried out by the inter-
viewed person at the time of the interview. (4) A review of the
available published and grey literature.
2.3.2. Assessing the practical mode of implementation of development
actions
Our long-term ﬁeld investigation also allowed investigating the
complex relationship between development projects and villagers,
and assessing the practical implementation of development inter-
ventions. We tried to analyze these actions both from the project’s
point of view and the villagers’ one, using a participatory observa-
tion approach. The best moment for observation appeared to be the
time when both social groups met, during meetings, visits and
interview times. We ﬁrst used the project’s ofﬁcial documents or
documents coming from other projects as a framework that could
be modiﬁed to accomodate unofﬁcial expert communications and
local situations.
The analysis of the development specialists’ practices was done
through different cross-checkable methods: (1) 4–12 villagers for
each study site were re-interviewed on their personal relations
with the development projects. These persons were selected on
the basis of their gender and level of responsibility and their will
to interact. In the same way, nine elders were interviewed on their
perceptions of the history of local development actions; (2) the re-
sults of development interventions are recorded in village-based
registers that we collected and compared with head ofﬁce’ records
but also with our own semi-direct interview data; (3) by staying in
villages and remaining as unobtrusive as possible, our everyday
presence allows transactions and comments between villagers
and development stakeholders to be observed with a low level of
perturbation, and so to have access to the interface between the
project corpus and the village.
2.4. Agent-based modeling
The selected ABM platform is Common Resources Management
Agent-based System (CORMAS) developed by CIRAD (Bousquet
et al. 2001). The model was split into an agro-ecological part and
a socio-economic part (Fig. 2). The main model functions are de-
scribed below in a qualitative way. Further details regarding the
functions and modeling methodology can be found in Saqalli
et al. (2010) and Saqalli (2008).
2.4.1. Building the village module
Individual agents are deﬁned as equivalent, which means that
they have the same attributes: only the values of these attributes
vary, deﬁning each agent and its characteristics (Verhagen and
Smit, 2003).Please cite this article in press as: Saqalli, M., et al. Targeting rural developmen
Syst. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.agsy.2010.12.007At the model initialization, ﬁfty villager agents are created in
the virtual environment. Initial villager agents are from various
ages (from 1 to 55 years old), gender, lineages (with a hierarchy
from 1 to 4, as a measure of the powerfullness of each kinship
group in the village) and land property (between 3 and 5 map cells
of 1 ha each). After the initialization step, gender and family rank
for a villager agent are the most important factors within the vil-
lage context. These two factors determine the access to all the so-
cial and/or economic activities, i.e., marriage, property, food and
money redistribution, millet farming, gardening (Zermou and
Gabi) and migration for men, gardening for women (Fakara only).
Ranks are deﬁned for all child agents but evolve for all adult agents
in each family. They are updated at the beginning of each time
step, as a function of newborns, new marriages, reaching adult-
hood and deaths. The head of the family possesses the highest
rank. However, the family’s head does not manage the entire mul-
ti-activity system of the family but only millet farming activities.
Other activities (livestock-keeping, migration, gardening, food
redistribution) are under the sole responsibility of the individuals:
each villager agent should sustain itself but also its dependents,
i.e., all people in the family with a lower rank and directly related
to him. This includes all the children but also younger brothers and
sisters, and all wives for the husbands.
Families can expand their land properties only if the family an-
nual consumption requirement is higher than the millet produc-
tion of the previous season. This happens quite often in the case
of Zermou (AQUADEV, 2006). The extension capacity depends on
the lineage values, the ratio between the available family man-
power and the family size (Gavian and Fafchamps, 1996), and a
distance-to-village opportunity cost factor (Loireau-Delabre,
1998). The manpower unit is deﬁned as the Farming Labor Unit
(FLU). Based on our observations, female and male adult man-
power are considered equivalent and equal to 1, not withstanding
the fact that female manpower may occasionally be more impor-
tant in practice. We condition the child manpower capacity on
age, i.e., for a child i in the village: Manpower (i) = Age (i)/20.
Adulthood is reached at an age of 16. Only married adult males
can have access to land ownership. As a strict condition to become
a village ‘‘citizen’’, each male adult agent has to marry at least once,
but may marry up to four times. Saving enough money to afford
the dowry is therefore an essential social step for each bachelor.
The model has a weekly time step. It is spatialized through a dy-
namic cellular automata matrix of the model, where each pixel is a
parcel of the village territory. Soil characteristics and rainfall are
attributed to each pixel based on a data-derived map of soil char-
acteristics (fertility, access to shallow water) and the rainfall spa-
tial variability as observed from the local ICRISAT raingauge
network (Gérard, 2005; Akponikpè et al., 2011). Biophysical and
farming processes are deﬁned for each pixel as identiﬁed by the
villagers and from literature data.2.4.2. Simulating villagers’ production activities
2.4.2.1. Agriculture. Only male adult agents can crop millet ﬁelds
during rainy seasons at all three sites. They can garden on bor-
rowed ﬁelds during dry seasons at the Maradi and Zermou sites.
For the Fakara site, the latter activity is restricted to female adult
agents. The sequence of cropping actions a male adult agent should
follow (sowing, weeding once or twice and harvesting) is condi-
tioned by a diagnosis of available manpower and minimization of
expected production losses. Crop growth is governed by the avail-
able manpower a villager agent can mobilize to carry out the right
cropping action at the right time, deﬁned by rainfall distribution
and by the fertility rate at each time step. A parcel’s fertility
evolves as a function of crop growth, a weed impact factor and
the amount of manure applied during dry seasons. Crop yields re-t interventions: Empirical agent-based modeling in Nigerien villages. Agr.
Fig. 2. Uniﬁed Modeling Language architecture of the SimSahel model. To ‘‘verb’’() indicates action procedures that is speciﬁc to the entity class. Figures indicate the number
of agents that may be connected to an other agent class. For instance, the 1–1 relationship between the State agent class and the villager agent class means that one State (i.e.
the social part of one villager) is connected to only one Villager agent: they both characterize one villager within the village. 1. — 1 linking the entity classes A & Bmeans that
at least one until an inﬁnite member of agents of class A can belong to (—e) or be linked with (—) one and only one B class entity.
M. Saqalli et al. / Agricultural Systems xxx (2011) xxx–xxx 5sult from a combination of the crop growth and harvesting time,
weeds, fertility and management.
2.4.2.2. Gardening. In Fakara, female adult agents follow an equiva-
lent sequence of actions for their dry season vegetable gardening.
Only married female adult agents with stepdaughters or with
unmarried daughters at least 12 years old can have access to gar-
dening. They can mobilize the available female manpower from
then on in a similar to the head of the family for millet farming.
In Zermou and Gabi, gardening is restricted to men and follows
the same pattern as in Fakara.
2.4.2.3. Migration. Only male adult agents more than 16 years old
have access to the migration activity. The price for the roundtrip
travel is the major constraint for leaving. The date of departure de-
pends on the family rank, i.e., the number of dependent relatives.
The weekly gain in income during migration is a function of the
location, season, and number of years of experience. To return
home, the migrant should overcome two constraints: (1) for pres-
tige reasons, a male adult agent cannot return to his village with-
out a minimum amount of money, at least the roundtrip ticket
for the next migration, i.e. 2⁄ 45.75 €; (2) Each migrant agent has
a certain probability of being fradulently charged by customs
agents he meets (racketeering risks in Table 1).
2.4.2.4. Livestock keeping. It is here limited to a saving scheme. Each
year, individual gains (crop production, migration, gardening) can
be transformed into livestock, with a depreciation factor. If family
yields are good enough, villager agents buy animals after crop har-
vest, when they have grain to sell, even though millet price is low-
est at that time (around €13.75 per 100 kg bag). When the granary
is almost empty, they sell animals to buy millet, but at that period,Please cite this article in press as: Saqalli, M., et al. Targeting rural developmen
Syst. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.agsy.2010.12.007millet price is high (€27.50 per bag on average). This 50% loss can
be considered as a livestock keeping cost. Upon returning from
migration, the migrants buy small ruminants they feed during
the rainy season. At harvest or sometimes before, they are sold
to pay for the travel expenses of the next migration. Animal fatten-
ing is in this case considered as compensating the 50% loss.
2.4.2.5. Fertility management and manure. Three fertility restaura-
tion processes are considered. The natural regeneration by shrub
and weed growth is simulated through a series of functions of fer-
tility originated from simpliﬁcation factors derived from d’Herbès
et al. (1997) and Wesel et al. (2000). Animal manure is applied to
ﬁelds in two ways. Animals graze during day time across the terri-
tory (Table 1), with no human management. Half of the animal fae-
ces is thus spread in the grazed areas. The other half is applied
through corraling at night (Ayantunde et al., 2000; Ayantunde
et al., 2002), which allows villagers to fertilize ﬁelds selected on
the basis of their distance-to-village and fertility level.
2.4.3. Assessing development action types
Development interventions are gender-speciﬁc. Inventory cred-
it and fertilizers are proposed to villagers at t = 0. For each adult
and married villager, choosing to be involved in one of the actions
is the only cognitive function included in the model: it is based on
personnal experience, i.e., a comparison of gains in annual income
with or without taking part in the development action. The gain is
based on food and income stock. In the absence of experience, all
adult villager Agents who manage millet ﬁelds or gardens try the
development action for the coming year.
2.4.3.1. Inventory credit. The decision to take part in the inventory
credit system is taken after harvest. When viewed as a form of sav-t interventions: Empirical agent-based modeling in Nigerien villages. Agr.
6 M. Saqalli et al. / Agricultural Systems xxx (2011) xxx–xxxing, the ﬁrst step towards participation in the inventory credit is to
determine if the agent (i.e., the head of the family or, if absent, the
highest ranking adult) has the capacity for saving. Hence, we con-
sider that every villager needs to keep at least enough millet to
feed all the family members who rely on him/her for half a year:
SMfiðtÞ > CAdiðtÞ=2 ð1Þ
With di: the number of family members of i relying on i at time t;
SMﬁ (t): i family millet stock at t; CAdi (t): annual food consumption
of the dependents di;
The second step is then a cognitive decision based on personal
experience, through a comparison of the mean gain achieved dur-
ing past years with saving through inventory credit and the mean
gain achieved during past years with no inventory credit or with
saving through livestock:
Wiðt  1Þ > NWiðt  1Þ ð2Þ
With Wi (t  1): the total ‘‘gain’’ of the family of all the previous
years when inventory credit was used, including the difference in
cash of the value of the livestock; NWi (t  1): the total ‘‘gain’’ of
the family of all the previous years without inventory credit, includ-
ing the difference in cash of the value of the livestock as well. The
‘‘gain’’ is either ‘‘reputation’’ in the reputation scenario or ‘‘income’’
in the economic scenario.
2.4.3.2. Fertilizers. Inorganic fertilizer application is possible
throughout the millet cropping season. Only millet ﬁeld or vegeta-
ble garden managers can buy fertilizers. The price of the bag of
inorganic fertilizers is 50 kFCFA (€75). According to the hill-placed
fertilizer (‘‘microdose’’) recommendations (Tahirou and Sanders,
2005), 0.2 bags of inorganic fertilizer is needed for a 1-ha parcel,
meaning that fertilizing one cell in the model costs 10 kFCFA
(€15). Gardens require 10 times this amount, such that fertilizing
a garden also costs €15 since we consider that one garden is one
tenth of a cell. Farmers select the ﬁelds which brought to his family
more wealth across all previous years with inorganic fertilizers
than without and rank them according to the wealth gain they
brought. After setting aside at least enough millet and/or cash to
satisfy the food requirements of him/herself and his/her depen-
dants for half a year, the rest of his/her savings is considered as
his/her ﬁnancial ability to buy fertilizers. This ability is in millet
and cash stock only, the sale of livestock cannot serve as a source
of cash to buy fertilizers, as we never observed anybody selling ani-
mals to buy fertilizers. This is consistent with the general assump-
tion that animals should be considered as savings or speculation
products by themselves but not as a means to invest in technolo-
gies that allow an increase in agricultural productivity. Relevant
ﬁelds are then fertilizer to the extent the farmer can afford it.
The ability to invest in fertilizers is based on the following rule:
SMfiðtÞ þ SCfiðtÞ > NFiðtÞ ð3Þ
With SMﬁ (t): the value of the millet stock of the family i; SCﬁ (t):
cash stock of the family i; NFi (t): the value of the inorganic fertiliz-
ers needs based on the acreage which brought more wealth to the
family across all previous years with fertilizers than without. When
the condition of Eq. (3) is met, a farmer can fertilize as many ﬁelds
as he can afford. Inorganic fertilizers have an immediate effect on
millet, which depends on the crop development stage (maturing
and harvest stages). During the maturing stage, there is a risk of
1% per rainy week of crop failure in fertilized ﬁelds because of the
chemical burn that can occurs (de Rouw, 2004; Koning and Smaling,
2005).
For each site, thirty 60-year simulations were run. Hence each
simulation covers 3120 weekly time steps, i.e., two generations.
Simulation outputs were obtained for the entire village, at family
level and at gender and age group levels. Village-level simulationPlease cite this article in press as: Saqalli, M., et al. Targeting rural developmen
Syst. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.agsy.2010.12.007results are compared to available data, i.e., our macro level ﬁeld
investigation results, literature review and the Niger national cen-
sus, in order to assess the consistency of the model. The two devel-
opment interventions are then compared individually or in
combination. As the founding of the village occurs at t = 0, the ﬁrst
5 years should not be considered as part of the simulation results
as they are strongly affected by the initialization process.3. Simulation results
A conﬁdence building step and a sensitivity analysis of the mod-
el have been carried out, whose results are discussed in Saqalli
et al. (2010). These results provided enough conﬁdence in the mod-
el for its further use for thematical analyses such as the one ad-
dressed in the present paper, both in terms of the reliability of
its outputs compared to external data and with respect to the sim-
ulated individual and collective behaviors compared to our obser-
vations and the relevant literature.
3.1. Comparison of sites in the absence of development interventions
3.1.1. Production assets: a structural geographic advantage
Average income per capita at ﬁrst follows a convex curve be-
cause of the generation effect: a very high adult per capita ratio
during the ﬁrst 5–10 years has positive effects on income (Saqalli,
2008). However, as a result of the ‘‘baby boom’’ during the years 15
to 30, the slope of the income curves gradually becomes negative
at all three sites (Saqalli, 2008). Nevertheless, both the absolute va-
lue of the income and the simulated amplitude of the income vari-
ations vary depending on the site: Fakara and Gabi show very
similar declining curves with a large decrease in income between
the years 15–60, whereas income at Zermou remains signiﬁcantly
lower at all times yet the variation in income is smaller during the
same period. Better biophysical (higher rainfall and soil fertility)
and economic conditions (lower migration, costs) in Fakara and
Gabi allow for higher individual income, which facilitates access
to marriage for men. This in turn reduces the delay for getting chil-
dren, which results in a decrease in the adult per capita ratio at
these two sites and consequently decreases income per capita de-
spite the overall better income.
Cropland acreage increases faster at Zermou than at the two
other sites because yields are very low at this site and the decision
to expand ﬁelds is conditioned by the food production level. The
land per capita ratio is therefore higher at this site than at the
two other sites during the ﬁrst half of the simulation period. How-
ever, as the manpower ratio of Zermou remains quite equivalent to
the two other sites, villagers at Zermou do not beneﬁt from this ra-
pid ﬁeld expansion as they cannot crop all the cropland properly.
Consequently, population growth is signiﬁcantly lower for Zermou
(321 ± 97 inhabitants after 60 years) compared to the Fakara
(585 ± 141 inhabitants) and Gabi (505 ± 131 inhabitants) (Saqalli,
2008). The substantial differences between Zermou and the two
other sites suggest that the Zermou site has exceeded a threshold
resulting from the accumulation of greater constraints.
3.1.2. Distribution of activities: site-speciﬁc specialization
All three activities (agriculture, migration and gardening) grow
in volume because of the demographic growth.
Per capita income from millet cropping varies according to the
site: Zermou shows a constant decline in farming income and even
a shift in the allocated labor from farming to migration between
the 15th and the 25th year (i.e., after the very rapid period of ﬁeld
extension). The two other sites have similar trends. After a period
of fairly constant income per capita (0–15 years), income per capita
from agriculture rises rapidly (15–30 years) due to the progressivet interventions: Empirical agent-based modeling in Nigerien villages. Agr.
M. Saqalli et al. / Agricultural Systems xxx (2011) xxx–xxx 7appropriation of new lands during this period of fast population
growth, which does not occur in Zermou. During at least the ﬁrst
half of the simulation, the Fakara population appears to be more
involved in farming and has higher farming income than at Gabi.
However, this latter site is the only location where farming income
per capita remain fairly steady between 35 and 60 years, eventu-
ally exceeding the per capita income ﬁgures from agriculture in
the Fakara during the last 15 years.
For the gardening activity, local social and economic rules dra-
matically affect the situation. Both the hausa-populated sites of
Zermou and Gabi restrict gardening to men. However, at Gabi,
the same villager can practice migration and gardening at the same
time, thanks to the immediate proximity of Nigeria which allows
frequent commuting at low cost, whereas this combination is not
possible at Zermou. Consequently, the use of the limited acreage
available for gardening at Zermou (Table 1) stops almost com-
pletely after a few years of simulation. Gabi sees a progressive in-
crease of the per capita income from gardening. This rise in income
is, however, lower than in Fakara, which may have beneﬁted from
the gender discrimination between gardening and migration (Ta-
ble 1). Gardening manpower allocation ratios concern women for
the zarma-populated Fakara and men in Gabi.
Regarding migration, the boom in population growth affects
migration earlier than farming. Indeed, migration is allowed for
men after they reach the age of 16, even if they are not married,
whereas marriage is a prerequisite to farm and ‘‘own’’ land. How-
ever, getting married causes the parental support for migration to
stop, which lowers the ﬁnancial ability to migrate. Whereas the
three sites show no signiﬁcant differences in the manpower alloca-
tion between the various activities before the population boom
(year 10–20), after this period migration seems to suffer from
site-speciﬁc factors that constrain this activity (Table 1): The lower
cost for departure and more nearby destination at Gabi allows pro-
gressively more people to leave and to bring back home more
money than in the Fakara. At the beginning of the simulation, it ap-
pears that the accumulation of constraints at the Zermou site
(higher departure costs, higher risks, poorer income from agricul-
ture) restricts the extension of this activity. However, the very
low income to be gained from agriculture and, the impossibility
of doing gardening progressively forces male villagers to reallocate
their manpower solely on migration.3.1.3. Inequality and sustainability: producing more for how long and
for whom?
As deﬁned by the model rules, the population at the Fakara and
Gabi sites expand their ﬁelds as a function of their manpower/
population ratios. Cropland acreage grows in Gabi at a nearly stea-
dy rate of 4.6% per year, whereas at the Fakara, this rate is 2.4% per
year and declining over time. As shown in Saqalli et al. (2010), the
results for the Fakara are compatible with interpolated ﬁeld expan-
sion data from 1950 to 1998. Zermou villagers rapidly conquer the
entire village territory, despite the fact that they are not so much
involved in farming, because of the far more rapid decline of the
ﬁelds’ fertility at this site. This result is compatible with the liter-
ature for various zones in Niger, including the Damagaram where
Zermou is located, but also other arable places in Niger for the
end of the ﬁrst half and the beginning of the second half of the
20th century. This conquering behavior is usually described as a re-
sponse to manpower scarcity but also as an ‘‘investment for the fu-
ture’’ at family and village levels (Demont et al., 2007; Bah et al.,
2006). Even with lower land occupation growth rates at Gabi and
the Fakara, 60 years of continuous growth eventually led to all po-
tential cropland being cropped. This means, however, that further
simulation results regarding sustainability and development inter-
vention impacts cannot be compared with the present situation,Please cite this article in press as: Saqalli, M., et al. Targeting rural developmen
Syst. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.agsy.2010.12.007particularly in Gabi where all available cropland has been culti-
vated for at least the last 40 years.
After the ﬁrst cropping years, average yields are not strongly af-
fected by land scarcity. Yields are signiﬁcantly different between
sites as determined by the model inputs and decline slowly from
400 to 550 kg/ha at t = 10 to 350 to 450 kg/ha at t = 60. This resil-
ience cannot be explained by a continuous compensation of the
old ﬁelds’ fertility loss by new fertile land because all available
land is already ‘‘conquered’’ at Zermou. It indicates that local farm-
ing systems are resilient enough at all three sites to maintain fairly
stable, albeit low yields. This yield level allows the populations at
the three sites to more or less satisfy their food requirements
throughout the simulation period. As people still live at these sites,
this simulation result provides some additional conﬁdence regard-
ing the model realism. It is also in broad agreement with Harragin
(2006) and Marinho (2007) who considered that food price shocks
affect food security more than local food shortages, and with the
works of Tabo et al. (2007) whose data show that Niger fertility
rates did not actually fall over the last 40 years despite the tripling
of the population. Analyzing the evolution of the ratio between the
annual per capita consumption and the per capita income from the
three main activities and the livestock capital, the model indicates
that whereas the ratio strongly increases at Gabi, it remains stable
for the Fakara and slightly declines at Zermou, making the latter
two sites more prone to food shortage crises.
The evolution of the gender income ratio indicates that it is dif-
ﬁcult for women to sustain themselves when having no access to
activities, as is the case at Gabi and Zermou. This ratio slightly
recovers over time at the Fakara thanks to female access to garden-
ing, which thereby explains the faster income redistribution ob-
served after gardening spread at year 18. The Gini coefﬁcients
are indicators for characterizing equity of a population (Dorfman,
1979). Gini index outputs established at family and individual lev-
els suggest another limitation of the three systems: all inequalities
between families and within families grow during the 60 years of
simulation.
3.2. Projects implementation: successes and failures
One should consider these 60 year trajectories with no social
evolutions as a way to analyze present-time trends in the pres-
ent-time social conﬁguration and not as a simulation trial with a
prospective purpose.
3.2.1. A low success mainly due to a poor saving capacity
Fig. 3 shows the impact of the development interventions.
Regarding inventory credit, the initial high values are artifacts,
which are due to the ﬁrst trials needed for villagers to get some
personal experience with inventory credit (Figs. 3.1 and 3.3).
Fig. 3.3 suggests that the quantity of saved millet strongly depends
on the site. At Zermou, yields are too low to both feed people and
save millet. Therefore, despite the hope for success of the inventory
credit system, local biophysical factors do restrict the potential im-
pact of this intervention as it is based on the assumption of a millet
surplus.
Inorganic fertilizer use also shows strong differences among the
three sites. Whatever the site, fertilizer use remains very low, with
fewer than 10% of farmers applying fertilizer (Fig. 3.2) and less
than 4% of the total surface being fertilized (Fig. 3.4). The Gabi
and Fakara populations show similar behaviors but at different lev-
els: as long as they maintain a high manpower per acreage ratio
(between t = 5 until t = 12 for Fakara and t = 20 for Gabi), which al-
lows them to easily clear new ﬁelds and to weed cropped ﬁelds,
farmers do not use inorganic fertilizers. The initial high values
are artifacts, which are due to the ﬁrst trials needed for farmers
to get some personal experience with inorganic fertilizers. Gainst interventions: Empirical agent-based modeling in Nigerien villages. Agr.
Fig. 3. Comparison among the three sites of mean simulation outputs regarding the impact of development interventions. 3.1. – Proportion of population involved in
inventory credit (warrantage). 3.2. – Proportion of population using fertilizers. 3.3. – Yearly average quantity of saved millet per capita. 3.4. – Proportion of cropland fertilized
by inorganic fertilizers.
8 M. Saqalli et al. / Agricultural Systems xxx (2011) xxx–xxxfrom activities other than farming are thus used for activities that
promise a higher return, such as migration. From year 20 onwards,
one can observe that the proportion of population using fertilizer
and the proportion of fertilized land reach a higher value at the
Fakara than at Gabi, which may be explained by an initially lower
fertility level at the Fakara. For the case where arable land remains
available, the Gabi population appears less interested in inorganic
fertilizers. One may thus suppose that inorganic fertilizers are not
attractive as long as fertile land is still easy to acquire. Present-day
ﬁgures for a fully occupied Gabi site show that two thirds of the
farmers actually use inorganic fertilizers. Therefore, simulating
present-time inorganic fertilizer use would require simulating a
situation with all available cropland being cultivated at Gabi.
Zermou farmers show a different behavior at the start of simu-
lations, largely due to their particular strategy of ﬁeld expansionPlease cite this article in press as: Saqalli, M., et al. Targeting rural developmen
Syst. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.agsy.2010.12.007for compensating their lower yields. The ﬁrst 25 years show that,
as long as the manpower/acreage ratio remains favorable and
new ﬁelds can still be cleared, one observes a growing use of inor-
ganic fertilizers. As off the moment, once all available cropland is
occupied, which leads to a drastic reduction in the interest for
farming, fertilizer use declines, essentially to zero.
3.2.2. Two development interventions targeting different groups of
populations
The simulation outputs corresponding to a scenario combining
fertilizer access and inventory credit shows that there is no syn-
ergy between inventory credit and inorganic fertilizers use strategy
(Fig. 3), suggesting that the logics and even the population groups
concerned by the two activities may be distinct. As fertilizer and
inventory credit users at Zermou are too few, the analysis will fo-t interventions: Empirical agent-based modeling in Nigerien villages. Agr.
Table 2
Comparison between project user families and the average population for various indicators.
For the sites of Gabi & Fakara taken together Inorganic fertilizer using population Inventory credit using population
Family characteristics compared to the average population (i) D (ii) D (i) D
Family head age - * ++ * + *
Lineage - - + / ) ++ )
Family Size - * + + ++ )
Manpower - ) / + ++ )
Land size - * ++ ) + *
Livestock - - ) + ) ++ *
Income per capita / ) + ) + *
Livestock per capita - + - + ++ *
Land per capita - ) - * + *
Manpower per capita + * + + + )
Manpower per cropped surface / * - + ++ )
Livestock per cropped surface - ) - ) + *
(i) - -: 25% and less; -: 10 to 25%; /: 10%; +: 10–25%; ++: 25% and more; +: 25%; ): ±25%; *: +25%.
M. Saqalli et al. / Agricultural Systems xxx (2011) xxx–xxx 9cuss on Gabi and Fakara only. Families using inorganic fertilizers
all have in common a higher manpower per capita but a lower land
acreage per capita and lower livestock per surface than the average
population. They can be split into two groups (Table 2):
 ‘‘Small young disadvantaged but growing families’’: their aver-
age lineage value is low (1.6 vs. 2.8 for the whole population),
suggesting that they may have been disadvantaged regarding
land access due to social tenure discriminations. Families are
small, manpower and owned land is low. The head of the family
is younger than average (35 years-old vs. 43). However, the
higher manpower/capita ratio allows the family to sustain itself
by diversifying income sources (millet ﬁelds, migration, and
after a few years, livestock sales and gardening). It also allows
the use of inorganic fertilizers by succeeding in all the millet
cropping cycle steps, particularly the higher manpower require-
ment for weeding. This group represents at most 30% of the
inorganic fertilizer users around the 15th year, and then
declines, eventually disappearing around the 40th year of the
simulation.
 ‘‘Large old but shrinking families’’: the family head is far older
than average (61 years-old vs. 43). Because of the non-coopera-
tive family organization (Saqalli et al., 2010), elder children
leave once they get married, taking with them some parts of
the livestock and manpower. The high level of income and live-
stock per capita allow mobilizing enough funds for compensat-
ing the declining manpower ratio. The group size at the
beginning of the simulations is higher by 25% in the scenario
combining both inventory credit and inorganic fertilizers com-
pared to the scenario with only inorganic fertilizers.
One should understand that these groups remain stable but
families are evolving along a sequence. For instance, one family
may belong to the ﬁrst group, leave the group and then enter the
second group. Anyhow, inorganic fertilizers seem to be used only
by families in transition: they cannot be used by the poorest as it
is too expensive, and the wealthiest can use other assets, particu-
larly manpower and livestock (especially small livestock) in a con-
text where land is still not a constraint.
For the two sites, inventory credit users are members of a un-
ique group that can be described as ‘‘large better-settled families’’:
their average lineage value is quite high (3.2 vs. 2.8), and the family
head is somewhat older than average (48 years-old vs. 43). Fami-
lies are big and growing, with larger number of young adults than
average and consequently, manpower and owned land are higher
as well. Inventory credit seems to be an alternative to livestock
as an income saving tool, but only families that are able to main-
tain a capacity for savings get involved.Please cite this article in press as: Saqalli, M., et al. Targeting rural developmen
Syst. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.agsy.2010.12.0074. Discussion and conclusions
The simulations indicate that the three sites evolve along differ-
ent trajectories due to their differing biophysical potential, which
inﬂuences demographic growth but even more so the manpower
ratio and the involvement in farming activities. Social and environ-
mental indicators suggest some degree of sustainability but also
the fragility of such systems under the simulated conditions, e.e.,
as long as new land remains available for cropping. However, par-
ticularly regarding Gabi, the temporal scale may have to be ex-
tended in order to simulate the current conditions. Indeed, nearly
all potential cropland is currently being cropped at this latter site.
The fragility of the system may thus even be higher in reality at
Gabi than suggested by the simulation outputs.
Our model indicates that the impact of both development inter-
ventions is also conditioned by the local biophysical conditions.
Involvement in inventory credit and inorganic fertilizer projects
occurs only at sites where millet savings are possible, which is
not the case at Zermou. Even so, involvement at Gabi and the Faka-
ra remains limited, with a greater impact of inventory credit than
fertilizers. These interventions actually require an investment
capacity that few people do have at the Fakara and Gabi. This
capacity is largely conditioned by the food requirement of each
family in relation to its manpower. Consequently, only a maximum
of 25% of the population engages in the simulated development
interventions. At the Fakara, inventory credit is met with some suc-
cess only during periods when enough manpower was available. At
the more fertile site of Gabi, the interventions, whose aim is to pro-
mote agricultural intensiﬁcation, do not have a large success as
long as new fertile land remains available. However, due to the
limited temporal scale, simulations do not provide information
regarding a possible intensiﬁcation process in a future context of
land scarcity. Therefore, these two interventions should be viewed
as support tools for only a limited portion of the population capa-
ble of going beyond the survival level, but not as a generic poverty-
alleviation panacea.
More generally, one can state that development projects often
focus solely on the costs/advantages of a development interven-
tion, assuming that such interventions will generate their own de-
mand. A detailed modeling of the target societies, as was done
here, rather shows that the size of the target groups for such inter-
ventions is fairly limited and strongly dependent on the biophysi-
cal constraints of the project site.
Project operators had better propose a variety of interventions,
assuming that an intervention, whatever its intrinsic quality, will
not encounter the interest of the entire population. Unfortunately,
many planning programs use a ‘‘fundraiser-oriented marketing ap-
proach’’, often suggesting that a given intervention can succeedt interventions: Empirical agent-based modeling in Nigerien villages. Agr.
10 M. Saqalli et al. / Agricultural Systems xxx (2011) xxx–xxxacross a whole country even though the data and information on
which the marketing relies are based on one local experience. By
suggesting the strong impact of local social and biophysical factors
and their local variability and distribution, our simulations allow
us to advocate a new marketing approach for development inter-
ventions, better focusing on the local and variable population de-
mands and speciﬁcities.
The present model results from a step-by-step construction
process, which may still be improved in the future. For instance,
 labor and land markets were not implemented. While land mar-
kets are still almost completely absent at the sites of Zermou
and Fakara, they do exist at Gabi, particularly for ﬁelds suitable
for irrigation, which is obvious in a context of total land occupa-
tion that we did not implement. There are still almost no labor
markets in Zermou, but Tahirou and Sanders (2005) and our
own observations in Fakara suggest that this activity, while
almost absent in the 90’s (Ada and Rockström, 1993; Loireau-
Delabre, 1998; Mounkaïla, 2003), is growing very rapidly at
those two sites.
 Although the literature often reports the Fulani to represent
around 10% of the local population, ﬁgures from Barbier and
Hazell (2000) suggests that they may actually represent around
one third of the total population in the Fakara. As they have a
different land and livestock use mode, including their presence
in a model may transform outputs and further prospectives.
 Yamba (2004) has noticed a generalization of divorce. Since no
data are actually available at the national level, the phenome-
non was not modeled but this factor may in practice have a
strong impact since women appear to resort to divorce at least
once in a lifetime, bringing with them assets, particularly small
livestock. This may provide more independence to the women-
driven local economy and more variability in the wealth accu-
mulation processes at family level (Turner, 1999).
This model was built on the hypothesis that the present-time
evolution of any farming system is best represented and under-
stood by integrating the system history and inertia, thereby mini-
mizing qualitative judgements. To start the village simulation from
its foundation appears more relevant than rebuilding a general
tenure or family pattern as ‘‘a copy’’ of an observed situation.
Whereas one can ﬁnd villages that are less than 60 years old at
the Zermou or the Fakara sites, none can be found at Gabi. There-
fore, because their dynamics are more ancient than the duration of
the simulation period (60 years), the present dynamics of some
Nigerien areas, such as Gabi, cannot be simulated properly. The
simulated outputs may well represent what could have been ob-
served at the time, but no longer correspond to the present time.
New phenomena may come up in simulations longer than the
60 years, as land scarcity will then appear at the different sites.
However, pursuing the simulation beyond 60 years may lead to
practical computing limitations as the computing time require-
ments rise exponentially. In any case, pursuing the simulations
without including some adaptation processes of the population
will obviously lead to population and environmental crashes in a
Malthusian approach. New simulation approaches that include so-
cial evolutions may bridge the gap between sociological and agro-
economic analyses and thereby open up the prospects of different
futures for these societies.
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